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committee controlled the channels of communication in
education, wartime publicity, and advertising to promote
natiOnalism.

The Committee on Public
Information and the Mobilization of
Public Opinion in the United States
During World War I: the Effects on
Education and Artists
Clayton Funk
Abstract
The Committee on Public Informatio n was established
during World War I to tum every channel ofcommunicalionand
education to promote the war effort. The Committee marshaled
~gencie5 ~f the pr~ss, education, .I?d ildvertising,. among o lhers
tnto wartime serVlce for the Commitlee. Thefollowing questions
are posed: 1) To what degree did the Committee practice direct
censorship in its promotion of wartime issues? 2) What was the
role of education in the w.utime cillmpaigns? 3) What was the
role of the artist in wartime .. nd how d.i d w.utime iII.r ! affect
public tASte?
~j5 artide is based on the theory put forth by uwrence A.
CremIn (1988), that both education and miseducation of the
public extends beyond schools, universities, libraries, museums,
and other formal educational institutions, to what knowledge
they learn from popular communication. I will show how the

The first section of the article outlines the structure and
purpose of the Committee on Public information. The second
assesses the innuence of the Committee on the schools,
universities, and correspondence art courses. The final section
discusses the successes and contradictions of the Committee,
with particulu regard to concepts of freedom and censorship
for the individual, the academy, and the artist.

The Formation and Structure of the Committee
on Public information.
DuringWorld War I, The United States witnessed a prolific
expanSion of mass t:ommunication under the supervision of the
United States Committee on Public Information (CPl). The
expansion of industry ove r the last quarter of the nineteenth
century spurred the growth of more uniform, systematiC
advertising. press, and education. By the turn of the century, the
nation emerged from small, local networ ks of public education
and communications, to nationa] networks made possible by
new educational research, the telegraph and railroad. People in
the East, the Midwest, and the West, particularly in dties, could
read the Arne puss on the same day, purchase goods from the
Arne catalogs, and receive the same education. When the US
entered World War I, it had the makings of nationa.1 formats of
education and communications, which would be galvanized by
the uniform publicity of the CPI.
The CPI enlisted artists, 5(:holars, and ;Ouma.lists in 191710
mobiliZe American public opinion in support of the war effort.
They transmitted a uniform body of patriotic knowledge
downward and outward to the public, as what was termed
"Americanism.'" This transmission was accomplished through
the channels of education, press, and advertising, to rally
Americans in support of the wa r effort.
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Stephen Vaughn (1980) described the mi xed public
sentiment over US involvement in World War I. Recent
immigrants, particularly o f German and Irish descent held
deeply divided loyalties towards the war, influenced b; their
"a ttachm~nt 10 German.y or dislike lor England"(p. 3). By 1917,
some8 nulllon persons In the US considered Germany their land
of origin. Over 2.5 ~lion immigrants had been born in Germany
and another 6 million were second-generation GermanAmericans. Many people, particul.llly Gennans, were devout
pacifiSts, which also posed a problem to mobilizing for war.
Lawrence Cremin' s (1988) account of the formation of the
CPI d~ribes how. Walter Lippmann-the progressive critic,
columrust, and adVisor to President Woodrow Wilson-wrote to
the P~~den t about the problem of mixed public opinion and of
recnutmg an anny from such a diverse public. Lippmann called
for the ~eation ~f a publicity dearing house to provide a steady
flow of ~n.(ormah~n and to counter rumors and lies. Considering
the paolls! sentu;nent of mlony recent immigrants. Uppmann
suggested that Wilson mobilize public opinion around the idelo
of fighting to achieve a durable peace.
To direct thi s publicity campaign, Wilson summoned
George Creel, a prog ressive journalist from Missouri. Cr~1 was
the publisher for the progressive K:~!~~~;~~f:.~
had written for newspapers in Denver,
re-election campaign. Cremin (1988) termed Creel '"'th e
prototypical progressive'" (p. 3401, who stood fo r the government
r e~~lation ~r utilities and transportation, and for universal
nuhtary traming. Creel noted in his goals for the Commitl~ that
although the US summons to war was "'answered without
question by the citizenship as a whole,'" in three years of
neu.tra~i1YI '"ltlhe land had been torn by a thou~.nd divisive
preJudices, stunned by the voices of anger and confusion, and
muddled by the pull and haul of opposed interests'" Knowing
tha! such conditions could not endure, Creel summoned the
nahon to show '"a passionate belief in the justice of America's
cause tha t could weld the people of the United States into
one ... mass instinct with fraternity, devotion. courage, and
deathless detennination." (Sullivan, 1917, p. 36) Creel brought
to the Committee his progressive colleagues Harvey O'Higgins
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of the DenverChiidren'sCourt; Edgar Sisson, the former editor
of the reform-minded Cosmopolitan maguine; and Carl Byoir,
circuhltion manager at Cosmopolitan.
The CPI presented propaganda as publicity. as more
expression than direct suppression or censorship of public
opinion, but this soh sell was backed with the force of Federal
legislation. Congress passed a bill in June, 1917 that defined and
punished espionage. Anyone found guilty of
insu.bordination, disloyalty, mutiny, and refusal of
duty. in the military or naval forces... or lwhol shall
willfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service
of the United States, to the injury of the service or of
the United States, shall be punished by a fine of not
more than 510,000. <quoted in Cremin. 1988, p. 341)
The Trading With the Enemy Act was ,lRother bill passed
four months later that authorized the censorship of messages
sent by international mail. The bill also required the translation
of all foreign man, messages, and press into English. and their
certification by the US Postmaster (1988).
The Complete Report of the ChajrQ!fD of the Commjtlec on
Public InfOrmation (1920) outlined the structure of the CPt as
dIvided into the domestic and the foreign sections. Both were in
fuJI operation around October 1917.
The DomesticSection had at one time over a dozen divisions
and bureaus. The Division of News Issued thousands of releases
to some 20,000 weekly news columns across the country. The
Division of Civil and Educational Cooperation produced
publications by noted scholars, which were intended to justify
American involvement in the war. Additionally, the CPl's
National School Service periodical, The Nationa! School Servjce
BulJetin, reached every American schoo!, and some 20 million
homes.
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The CPI and Its Reform of Education

The Division of Pictu.res and lhe Division of Films featured
such SiMS a$ Mary Pickford and Douglas Fairbanks promoting
the sale of War Bonds. Speakers from The Division of Four
Minute Men spoke at intermissions in film theatres, and Ihe
Division of Four Hour Men sent spuken across the country to
add.ress clubs and associations about the war and related issues.
To boost national morale and promote public safety, The Division
of Advertising arranged for some 800 monthly and weekly
publications to donate advertising space to the CPI, saving Ihe
War Department almost 5 million dollars (Vaughn, 1980).
Sponsors also donated advertising space to the YMCA, the
YWCA, and the Red Cross to promote draft registration,
conservation of fuel, hygiene. and public and home safety. The
Division of Pictures supplied photography of wartime events
for Illustrating calendars and postcards. and the Division o f
Pictorial Publicity employed artists to d eslgn pro~ganda posten
and public monuments. Other components of the CPI included
the Bureaus of War Expositions. of State Fair Exhibits. and o f
Work with the Foreign Born. The Division of Women's Work
encouraged women to participate in the War effort.

Precursors
Creel and his colleagues did not invent the network of
education and communication channels that carried their
publicity. Most of this network had ~en un~er deve~opment
since the late nineteenth century. particularly In educahon. One
of the reasons education was 50 useful to the CPI was that both
the US educational system and The Committee were organized
according to principles of Industrial efficiency.
The fundamental structure of these principles was
established according to principles of scientific management,
introduced first to industry by Frederick Taylor, at the turn of
the century, to measure the work economy and productivity of
factory workers. The Taylor System was grounded in f~ve
components: 1) Efficiency of motion to eliminate wasted motion
and time; 2) The standardization of tools and motions to ensure
consistent work; 3) The task idea, which outlined what and how
a task should be done; 4) Foremen who saw that a job was done
in the right way; 5) The governance of a planning department
that would calculate time and motion to derive solutions to
work.related problems (Callahan, 1962).

The foreign SKtion was not as intricately subdivided as the
national section. Its purpose was to transmit US policy to the
allied powers, defending US neutrality before entry into war,
and later. promoting US r easons for going to war. The
le-chnologies of radio and motion pictures made possible the
spread of war propaganda over long distances. These policies
were curied by the CPI's Wireless News Service. which
transmitted daily dispatches to Europe, Asia, and u tin America;
and the Film Bureau, which distributed features about wartime
at home and abroad.
Virtually every educational and communication channel to
the public was covered. One of the largest cultural agents to be
put to work for the CPt was the US educational system of
schools. universities, and colleges, along with commercial
correspondence courses. Without the cooperation of education,
the ability of the Federal Government to spread its gospel of
Americanism would have been Impaired (Vaughn. 1980).

I

Several hybrids of T"ylor's system were developed late.r
for education by administrators and efficiency experts,
principally to train the work force for industry. and to make
education more cost-efficient. The US education system had
been riddled by public criticism of administrative waste and
ineffectiveness, particularly in public schools funded by
taxpayers. Administrators turned to scientific management to
curb waste, and to defend themselvt"S. Everything fr om teaching
to janitoring was analyzed SCientifically and streamlined. For
example. according to Franklin Bobbitt (1913), in TM Twdfth
YtQrbookof tkt NatioMl Socidy/or tht Sh/.4yo/ f4llcation, students
were termed "'raw material," that entered the educational system
on one end. and emerged on the other end as if educated products.
The teachers were selected according to standards and
qualifications. and the output of trained teachers was to be
consistent in quality. Such standards. which were to be kept
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throughout the teache.r'. service, included curriculum content
and methodology with specific guidelines for the amount of
time to be devoted to lesson preparation and actual instruction.
In sum, education that was organized uniformly, taught
uniformly, and understood by the most re<:eivers, for the least
cost, was education at its most efficient (Callahilln, 1962).
Scientific: millnagement structured industry and education,
creating the expansive network that could be used to disseminate
the publicity of the CPI and tum the tide of public opinion to
Americanism. The institutions of formal education were the
most effective tools of the CPI, operating within iii broadened
definition of education that included not only what the public:
learned from formal educational institutions, including schools,
colleges, and universities, but also from the informal influenas
of commercioJl correspondence courses oJnd pictorial publicity.
The Schoob and the CPI
Stephen Vaughn (1980) observed that one of the most
forceful influences on the schools was the CPl' s National School
Service (NSS). As mentioned previously, The National School
Service ByUelin reached virluoJlly every home and school in the
US. Guy Stanton Ford di.re<:ted publication of the Bulletin, and
William C. Biilgley of Teachers College, Columbia University
served as editor. Bagley evidently had a major influence on the
Bulletin. like the NSS, his educational theories also stressed
social responsibility and opposed "self-centeredness and
individualism as the ultimate goal of educoJtion" (p. 101).
Indeed, school children were a crucial link in the CPI's
connection to US families. Thecultural influences that immigrant
families brought to the US was as diverse as the landscape: of US
public opinion . The CPJ persuoJded educoJtors to help their new
immigrant students adapt to A.merican life. The COmmittee was
concerned that immigrants brought from their homelands politics
and social customs much d ifferent fro m the old Yankee.
Proteslanttradition. Independent political action was not a part
o f the immigrant's former experience, since millny were
"ccustomed to the authoritilfian hierarchy of the Old World
governments. Civic relations were personal obligations and
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politiCS came out of family needs, ,,11 of whlch were placed llhove
allegiance to In abstract code of I"ws Ind morals. Such personal
obligations "re understandllbleconsidering th" t most immigrillnts
struggled in dire working Ind living conditions. Newcomers
were encouraged by the NSS to assimilate whoJt wuconsidered
old-stock, middle-<:Ius Americ"n patrio tism, in which civic
duty "nd responsibility were to be revered with personal
disinterest, pl"cing public duties oJbove the self. Person,,1
independence was exercised for the good of all. Two" .. :sterling
ideals' of true Americanism ' were equality of opportunity and
the spirit of oblig"tion and service""(National School Servia,
quoted in Vaughn, 1980).
It wu hoped that assimilation to US citizenship might be
faciJi tated by the abolition of immigrant colonies (Vnghn, 1980).
Immigrants were expected to shed old world ways to fit into
American life, and the schools played" significant role in what
w"s termed the Americani:ution of the foreign born. Teachers
were asked to show compassion and patience, for instance, with
new children who mispronounced English words. They took
their students on williks to public buildings "nd showed them
other "speds of American life. Teachers were also expected to
encour"ge the native-born children to tre"t their new ))H'rs
courteously,and toelim.inalenicknames. The NSS tried to convert
the foreign born to the American way of life, "to encourage love
and respect fo r America and its institutions, 50 that the immigrant
would want 10 settle here" (Vaughn, 1980. p . 107).

V"ughn (1980) observed that another of the teacher' s duties
was to educate about war. Primary school teachers were
encouuged by the NSS "10 use the naluroJl interest in war" (p.
109). The sand table was one of the best places to teach such
lessons. Teaehers were to let the natuf.1 Wilt interest run its
course, and then interject heroic anecdotes about soldiers, to
inspire the students' fuller expression.
Wartime changes occurred also at high schools. For instance,
geography wu adapted to wartime Issues. Siudents were to
indicate Paris's eight natur,,) defenses on maps supplied by
National Geographic. Such cou rses as m"them"tics. heilllth, and
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homemalting; imluslrial arts, arithmetic, and history were all
Ildapred to themes of thrift, citizenship, and hygienic habits.
The theme of wartime thrift was also common sub~t matte.r in
high schools. The necHsary conservation of food and fuel , the
5Ilving of money, and the elimination of wllSte were stressed as
preparation for adulthood's social and economic responsibilities.
Further, military training. health and 5Ilnitation were made
duties to the nation during school time. Bagley held perforce
th.tt no Issues were more important than habits of good health
and hygiene, and were considered socially efficient {Vaughn,
1980}.
Art lessons at all levels were influenced by the NSS. For
example, The Detroit Board of Education'sTrachini: of Patriotism
(1918) mandated patriotic lessons for every student from
kindergarten through junior college. Art educati on was
structured to stimulate "noble emotions" through the design
and completion of plltrioti<: posters, to develop "'taste and
reverence for beauty which could find no triumph in wanton
vandalism" (1918, p. 7). This was. Change from the art teaching
of seven yean earlier, when drawing was IlSsigned from subjects
of nature to develop a sense of beauty and harmony, IlS in the
Detroit public schools' orawlng: Plan of Work for the Grammar
G@des (1911). The 1911 requirements focused art teaching on
nature to develop the artistry of children. By 1918, reqUirements
re-focused on nationlilistic themes of patriotic character. Similar
sh!fts occurred in other cities such liS Kansas City and Chicago,
With the goal of preparing heart, body, ilftd mind for future
military service.
Higher Education
The efficiency reforms that began with scientific
milnag.ement in industry were also estilbHshed in higher
educilhon by 1910, und er the guidilnce of Henry Pritchett, head
of The Ca~egie Foundation for the AdVilnce.ment of Teaching.
The late mneteenth-century practice of medicine, law, and
educiltion, among others, suffered from inconsistent training
and the liIpid s~read of qUilckery ([Agemann, 1983). The year
1910 brought uniform standards for training in medicine, law,
and social work, guided by Pritchett. Pritchett and his colleague,
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Frank Vanderlip: the president of The National City Bank of
New York, ad.nured German education, and influenced the
incorporation of these empirical methods within Americ.Jn
universities, which eventually included teacher tr.Jining (1983).
Vanderlip was called Iliter to the CPI as head of the Will Savings
Committee, to oversee the thrifty use o f wartime resourttS, il
task he held essential to a nation in the life-and-death struggle.
The recent reforms o f US universities to standardized
professioNlI training were useful to the CPI as well . Professors,
journalists, and other experts beame the bnin trust of the CPI;
the university facilities housed military tra.i ning; .J.nd the
curriculu m for regular college students turned to wartime issues.
Professors who worked for the CPI served as experts who
encapsulated war politics in slogans, films, educational materials,
and parades. Guy Stilnton Ford was one of the most influential
ac~demics to join the CPl. As graduate dean ill the University o f
Minnesota, Ford sent an open leiter to aU high school prindpals,
and to Creel, suggesting that all commencement themes focus
on patriotism . Creel was impressed and brought Fo rd
immediately to the CPI (Vaughn, 1980).
Fo rd' s presence at the CPI worked to its advantage. Ford
possessed invaluable background in Gennan scholarship from
the Universities of Iowa, Wisconsin, Berlin, leipzig. ilnd
Gottingen, and from his d octoral work on Hanover and Prussia
at Columbia, in 1900. Ford's presence attracted other uni versity
professors who worked under his supervision as the Division of
Civic and Educationill Cooperation, changed later to the Division
of Civic and Educational Publications. Assisting Ford were
some 3,000 scholars and write.rs, such as Samuel B. Harding.
who taught European history and Patriotic History at Indiana
University. Much of Harding's research for the CPI went into
the patriotic wu pamphlets, articulating the natio n.Jlistic
orthodoxy of the CPI.
One of the universities that underwent significant reform
duri.ng World War I was the University of K.JnsIls (UK). Shortly
lifter Congress declued Will in 1917, the UK administration
notified President Wilson, despite mixed feelings among its
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faculty, that their facilities were completely at his disposal
(Griffin, 1914)_ The University did not give in to the war effort
without Congressional pressure. Congress voted in 1911to give
students who passed their courses and departed for service in
the war full credit for a semester's work. UK Faculty who were
previously cloistered from public life, and were accustomed to
a fair degree of academic freedom, now felt sharper control from
Congress. This external pressure and the severe decline in
enrollment made UK's survival impossible without their joining
the war efrort (Griffin, 1914).
Those remaining UK students and faculty with military
background organiZed three volunteer, paramilitary companies
of about300memberseach. Lacking weapons and paraphernalia,
they drilled and did calisthenics fo r one hour a day, a routine
worth up to six credits per semeste.r. By the next fall , however,
when the University adopted the War Department'scompulsory
military program, campus life changed mote dramatically.
Whether they wanted or not, women took courses in hygiene,
first aid, and home and community sanitation, and men were
required to join a university regiment sponsored by the War
Department (Griffin, 1974).
The situation was similar at other universities. University
of Wisconsin President Charles R. Van Hise argued that colleges
and univenities, as cenlen of enlightenment and free thinking,
were the last institutions that should give in to the military idea.
There arose a general fee.ling that the American definition of
"democratic higher education'" had changed radically in 1917.
The landmark university reforms of free thinking and educational
opportunity, established in the late nineteenth«ntury byCharJes
Eliot of Harvard and Andrew White of Cornell, were put aside
in favor of freedom interpreted as patriotic education. Some
administrators and faculty members of the day we.re jubilantly
patriotic, although most never fo rgot that universities had joined
the war effort to survive.
Course Offerings seemed to change overnight, thanks to
changes marshaled by the US War Department. Except fo r courses
in mechanical drawing. camouflage, and ~wa r art'" (a catch
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phrase for publicity illustration and camouflage design),
traditional fine arts courses were displaced to attics and spare
rooms. Although universities sacrificed such curricula for
wartime, the enrollment inindustriilll arts and s<:iences elCpillnded
after the war, and not until then did universities reap the benefits.
Such new vocational departments as engineeri.ng. medicine,
home economics, and chemistry, added orrefonned for wartime,
enjoyed increased enrollment after the war. The same was true
for mathematics, physics, engineering,shop work, and drafting
for men; and dietetics, chemist.ry, and mechanical drawing for
women. Courses deemed useful for wartime garnered new
prestige and popularity in peacetime. Veterans and other
students seeking a patriotic, professional education enrolled in
such pro fessional training courses as i ndustrial arls and
mechanical drawing. For once such courses passed the litmus
test of wartime utilitarianism, and we.reassocialed wilh the high
standards of the university, they garnered new prestige as
unive rsity-level professional training.
A Correspondence Art Coune iIInd the CPI
Art training forself-sludy at home was available asearly as
the Civil War, and it reached students in the hinterlands and
cities alike. Many children learned drawing from such books as
John Gadsby Chapman's American Drawin, Book (1858). Some
industrial and freehand drawing courses were taught in rural
academies, which were organized haphazardly, usually unde.r
local governance {Sizer, 19641.
In 1876, the Philadelphia Centennial Exposition revealed
weaknesses i n US education and art compared to other European
exhibitors. The exhibit from Russia that included Ihe Moscow
Imperial School demonstrated thai manual training provided
mental diSCipline. John Runkleof MIT was impressed and argued
contentiously for manual education to be incorporated into
general education. The result was a triumph of vocational
education over mo re artistic concerns (Efland, 1990). For the rest
of Ihe nineteenth century industry expanded with new, larger
factories, staffing them with larger work forces. Formallraining
in drawing and industrial arts became more accessible in cities
across the land, thanks to thenewlydeveloped art and industrial
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training in public high schools. Workers were trained in manual
training and industrial and freehand drawing by their company
or in the schools, which became the young person' s ticket to a
career In the city (Korunik, 1985).
During World War I, such schools as Art Instruction,
Incorporated, of Minneapolis, Minnesota, which was known
then u The Federal School, rostered correspondence students
who learned ., patriotic version of advertising design at home.
Nothing appears on the school's publications to show a dired
alliance with the CPI, but the school's curriculum wasconsistent
with the CPl' s approach. Enrollment was done by filling oul a
matchbook form and mailingit to The Federal School . A salesman
for the company would later visit the applicant's home for an
interview, Ind, in a short time, course materials were shipped
(Funk, 1990). The instruction manuals covered such subj«ts as
design and decoration, advertising illustration, animal draWing,
and fashion illustration. The pedagogy was simple. Students
progressed from book to book and mailed their completed
projects to Minneapolis The projects were examined and returned
with corrections.
Posters from CPI's Division of Pictorial Publicity appeared
in the school 's Federallllustntor, and the CPI also advertised in
the Illustrator for its poster competitions. One of these contests
solicited entries for the best poster to recruit shipbuilders. The
contest sponsors included Ihe National Service Section. US
Shipping Board, Emergency Fleet Corporation, and National
Committee of Patriotic Societies, with the cooperation of the
New York Sun . The institutions o f government, industry,
education, and the press collaborated in a single artistic, cultural
effort for the war. The poster that best conveyed the need to
speed up ship building W.JS .Jwarded 1,000 d ollus (The Federal
Illustrator, 1918).
The advertisement solicited artists of varying notoriety
from across the nation . Contestants were sorted into three
categories: soldiers .Jnd sailors, Shipyard workers, and pupils of
graded and high schools. The panel of ten judges for the contest
was also diverse, including people from education, shipping,
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and advertising. not the least of them Professor Arthur Wesley
Dow, of Teachers College, Columbia University. Entries to the
ship building contest and other such competitions were judged
on both pa.triotic ~nd aesthetic merits. ThemosteJfectivepatriotic
concept and best crafted poster was judged to be the best work.
Poster contests brought together the artists tr.Jined by
correspondence instruction and those by formal education for
the common purpose of supporting the war. Few of the Federal
School students would have the chance to study art at a notable
school, and the Federal School provided at least a tute of what
it was to be an artist. Some students learned their (int drawing
and painting lessons from the Federal School with some
continuing on to advanced training. In the end, the Federal
School probably did not create master artists in every town, but
m~ny students may have fancied the .Jllure of becoming an
~rtist. And if for no other reason, the novelty of being an artist.
coupled with patriotism gave everyoneconcemed their chance
to d o their bit fo r the war.
Never before had the entire spectrum of education been so
saturated with s uch a unifying cause as the CPl's agenda . The
Committee covered at every level of education and reached into
the home and the community. Education, particularly in
universities, supplied the scholars and lTa.ined professi onals,
without whom theCPI would have failed . However, as useful as
it was to the Committee, formal education alone was not enough .
It was the sweeping effect of the Divisions of Pictorial Publicity
and advertising that created the images and slogans for the w.Jr
that would ring in the minds of Americans.

Artists and the CPI
The artist Charles Dana Gibson, who headed the CPI' s
Division of Pictorial Publicity, known also as 'The Vigilantes',
expressed dearly the aim of pictorial publici ty:
America, sep.Jfated from Europe, was too far removed
to understand the war. Until Americans were made to
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feel the war's hOlTor$, they would not be aroused
.(Vaughn, 1980, p. 150)
Gibson's emotionaJ appeab for public attention smacked
of the sensationalized press and advertising illustration, which
appealed to the emotions with glamour and hype rather than the
sensibility of old-time salesmanship. Illustrated magaZines and
books were a luxury, purchased only by those who could afford
them. The advertisers who worked for the CPI knew that
sensational pictures could sell anything. even the war. The
entire public must have been dazzled when wartime posters and
monuments calTied the sensationalized and glamorized images
of wartime (Cremin 1988).
The artists C. B. Falls, James Montgomery Flagg. Arthur
Dove, and Malvina Hoffman, among others, worked under the
supervision of Charles Gibson, as the Division of Pictorial
Publicity {United States Commilteeon Public Information, 1920)_
They were generally trained in the realist tradition. Gibson
himself studied with William Merritt Chase, Augustus S.
Gaudens, and Thomas Eakins (Rawls, 1988). Gibson was a
celebrity for his drawings of the Gibson Girls produced for
Coca-Cola advertisements and fountain trays (Pendergrast,
1993). His reputation must have enhanced Ihe appeal of wartime
publicity.
The CPI recruiled also from art and architec l ure
associations. Assisling Gibson were Herbert Adams, president
of the National Academy of Design; E. H. Blashfield, former
president of Ihe Sociely of American Artists; former president of
Ihe Architectural League, Cass Gilbert; and Joseph Pennel, who
designed the Panama Canal (Vaughn, 1980).
Gibson supervised the design of pictures, parades, and city
monuments. For example, one of the posters showed a robed,
Beaux Arts-styled figure o f a Red Cross Nurse cradling a
wounded soldier. A similar robed female figure appeared aho
as the symbol of public opinion. Molhers were depicted as
giving up thei r sons for military service. Additionally,
monumental replicas o f Beaux Arts sculpture and political works
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lined the nation's streets and parks, and patriotic displays filled
store windows along Fifth Avenue in New York City (Vaughn,
1980). Many of these other wartime monumenls were similar to
Victory Way that ran five blocks on New York's Park Avenue,
from 45th Street to 50th Street. The avenue was lined with
col umns, and rows of pyramid·shape:d stacks of cannon balls
ran down the center of the slreel, creating a ma ll for amory
displays. Each pyra mid and column was topped with an eagle or
a winged, female figure, commemorating victory(Stem, R.A.M.,
Gilmarti n, G., &:Mellins, T., 1987).
More inflammatory posters depicted German "Huns" as
kidnappers and frightening giants. In some images they towered
over battlegrounds strewn with molested women, set against
the backdrops of burning cities. On another poster Ihe Norl h
American Continent appeared with the caption "German Norih
Amerika," and cautioned the public about the threat of German
"Kultur" infiltra ting the Western Hemisphere. Promotional
posters, including one calling for shipyard volunteers, succeeded
i n recrui ting 250,000 additional shipyard personnel. Other
campaigns for war savings stamps, food conservation, and liberty
loans made prolifiC use of iIIustralions by Gibson's division.
Vaughn (1980) observed that Creel believed public opinion
to be rational and held the function of the CPI to be educational,
but Gibson barely considered the idea in his alte mpt to raise
enthusiasm. The Division of Pictorial Publicity made headway
for advertising in wa ys few expected. "Many writers who in the
1920s were to become critics of the rational nature of manpeople like Walter Lippmann and Edward Bemays-Ieamed
much from the study of such war propaganda" (I980, p . 191). So
successful was the work of the CPI artists that it won prestige fo r
advertising w ith the result that many adve rtising artists senl
thei r works to the CPI hoping for recognition. Creel had thought
early in the war of advertisers as "plausible pirates" (Creel
quoted in Vaughn, 1980, p. 192) But he came 10 believe that if
nothing else advertising had gained "'Ihe dignity of a profession
.... and (t]he advertising division abl y demonstrated the
possibilily of national campaigns" (p . 192).

136 Fu.nJc

The CP., Successes and Contradictions
The CPI set out to eduute Ameriuns in n.atio~ values.
But as much as the CPI was organized with the appearance o(
keeping American publicity (ree (rom rumors and lies (Cremins,
1988), and to secure democracy during a time of national crisis,
it cannot be ignored that the CPI compromised these claims by
the end of the W.lf.
The individual initially responsible for the blueprint of
how these values were to be tr.nsmilted across the nation was
Walter lippmann. Cremin (988) observed that Lippmann
"changed the way Amerluns thought about thei r larger
education via the press· (p . 183). His Public Opinion (922)
o utlined the way s uch education would take place. Written after
the war, the book reflects c ritically on publiC opinion and
propaganda . The problem that Lippmann saw was that most
Americans learned to make up their minds on public issues from
informa tion at hand, not from fi rs t hand facts. He held that the
world of politics was
'out of reach and out of mind for most of the
public.' ... Wh.llt ind.ividuals substituted (or that world
(was] a series of pictures in their heads, de rived from
p ropaganda, public relations, ... political, economic,
and social interest groups via the printed media,
especially newspapers proffering news. (Cremin, 1988,
p.l83)
Lippmann believed that such a clearinghou5(' for publicity
and education.lS the CPI would sort rumors and opinions from
hidden facts, and deliver to the public the truth apart from
opinion. Making such a clearinghouse independent fr om
·intellectuals and politicians" (p. 183) freed it to present the
truth. But this was not a simple strategy, and for the CPI to
educate Americans in national values involved as much
education as it did miseduution. This is revealed in three
considerations: The (PI plilcticed more censorship than it
professed, education lost more control than expected, and the
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artists were used as public servants, and their ·servanthoodhelped to reform pubic taste.
I. Freedom, Censorship and the individual
The first consideration is freedom and censorship, as
exercised by the CPI. President Woodrow Wilson defined
Americanism as utter belief in principles of American democracy,
and putting them first above anything else that might compete.
"But it was easy for the popular mind to associate Americanism
with loyalty to the nation, ra ther than with loyalty 10 democratic
individualism" (Vaughn, 1980, p . 234).
The French, English. and German publicity campaigns.
which started earlier than the CPI, had been harsh. The penalty
for insubord ination in France was being court-martialed, and
more than 80 soldiers were executed. In Great Britain, pacifist
organizations experienced official raids and seiZures. and
conscientious objectors were sentenced to up to three years of
hard labor. Military officials in Germany and Austria-Hungary
were empowered by their emperors for censorship, search and
seizure, and general military rule.
When Creel and Wilson set up the CPI they sought to
balance publicity and censorship to avoid the hal1lhness of the
Eu ropean policies descr ibed above. Creel. who supported
expression not suppression, was involved by the end of the war
in direct censorship. Publications and mail were censored
somewhat indiscriminately, and books, magazines, and cable
messages were intercepted toavoid spreadingsecret information.
Pacifism was regarded unfavorably, and was considered apart
from the nationalist cause.
For all of Creel's p rogressive crusades as a journalist, the
CPI's representations of women and African·Americans were
sur prisingly stereotypical. Though not a direct form of
censorship, stereotypical images reinforced generalized
exp«tations about groups of people, which tended to limit the
way others saw them (Lippmann, 1922). In the CPI posters,
women were depicted in posters as helpless victims, and in
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traditional roles as mothers and nurses. African-Americans were
also stereotyped, especially in one film , in which four men were
captioned as tap dancing with ·"rhythm' in France no less lhan
under the southern sun'" (Vaughn, 1980, p. 207). Along with
pacifists and social reformers, African-Americans were also
suspect of socialist or communist sympathies (WiesenCook,I992).
In Creel' s earlier experience as a journalist, he always
exercised the belief thai the average individual was capable of
rational, Informed judgment. Yet during World War I, in his
zealous attempt 10 rouse public opinion, he went against this
belief. This sensational charge of wutime publicity was very
powerful, and it survived after World War J. Thrift campaigns
and Americanization of the foreign born continued throughout
reconstruction, and patriotism ma.intained its zenith in the
national consciousn"s into the 1920s.lrrationality was accepted
over rationality, often to the point of Man unthinking loyalty to
the state'" (Vaughn, 1980, p .236). Ouring the 19205, perhaps the
most extreme manifestation of this mentality was the Red Scare,
and its purge of suspected Bolsheviks and Sodalists from the
United States (Wi esen-Cook, 1992).
n , Freedom, Cenlorship and Academy
The second consideration is freedom and censorShip in the
academy. as affected by the CPI. A fundamental historical
development in US school education over the twentieth century
was that schools lost power to the mass culture of advertising.
mass media. and government regulation. Scientific management
had fostered I. r igid, doll.u-conscious educational system.
Superintendents su ffered con stant criticism over administrative
wute and incompetence. They were .JCcused of worrying more
about "pencils and paper (and) ... the employment of janitors
and clerks, ... than ... about the educative process that goes on in
the schoolroom" (Callahan, 1962, p 203). The general feeling
arose among such progressives as Guy Stanton Ford that colleges
of education were educating self-satisfied technicians to
undertake the tasks that called for educational statesmen. Public
anger over this d istributio n of educational priorities in the
schools rose 10 a feverish pitch . Perhaps the angry public saw
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the answer to their worries in the CPl's promotion of national
character, dtizenship. and responsibility to others.
The question remains yet as to why those so-called
educ:ational priorities were absent in the first place. Raymond
Callahan's (1962) answer was that, despite lamentations that
business held too much control in sc:hool affiilirs during the rise
of scientific management, the fundamental problem was in the
training of educational administrators, not the aggreSSive
business agents who were allowed to capitalize on improving
erficienc:y in the schools. If administrators had been trained in
the more humanistic and theoretical background needed to set
~uc:ational polky, instead of business methods, they might
have beller defended their schools systems.
In consequenc:e, the schools were marshaled by the power
of the CPt to the point where the NSS could circumvent county
superintendents, for example, by sending publicity bulletins
directly to schools. Superintendents and teachers could have
ignored these bulletins and other n otic:es, just as newspapers
could have Ignored the CPI press releases, but they did not. If
they changed any publicity about the war, it was usually
manipulated to whip up more frenzy (Vaughn, 1980).
Universities were pressured into service, in order to avoid
fiscal jeopardy. Even though they benefited from inc:reased
enrollment in professional courses, there prevailed a strong
emphasis of anli-intellectualism, which won favor after the war
for vocational aims in highe.r education (Hofstadter, 19M).
Course work throughout the 19205 and into the 19305, eSpecially
in art, was watered down. Courses in art were incorporated with
industrial and home arts departments, with such course titles as
Making the Home More Democratic. The results of educational
aptitude tests were used to sort "esser" students from "brighter"
students. It seemed on the surface that Ihe gates of rollege
education had been thrown open for all, but students were still
separated, with lower students placed in the vocational and
applied training. which usually included applied arts and design,
and the brighter students placed in liberal arts (Ruloph, 1962).
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The Federal School promoted that the professional success
01 ~ts siudents W~5 possible through hard work ilnd iii patriotic
atlllu~e . The blm~nlhly Ewert! Illustrator promoted the
~tenllaJ ,of professlona I success in an arl c.reer by fealuring Ihe
blographl.es of well-known artists E. H. Blashfield and Lauros
M. Phoenix, who worked forlhe CPI uC.lImoufJage artists In ' 1$
regulu column, "Who' s Who in the Federal Schoo'" (916) t~
Federal School's sales MaRiger Edward S. Smith boi.sted 'Iha~
comme~dill artls~5 generally earned the highest wage of any art
profeSSional . Smlth makes no ilttempl to ,'uslify the holl
.
ofth ' I '
"h
.
ownng
IS c ,u rn Wit
s tatistics,
but his sales p itch was delin
', .

success as ~n artist ~eant earning money. As any other wor~:~
or professlonil': artists ,;anted and deserved the pay due to
them. ,For Smith and hiS company, advertising artists were
prof~S5,lOnals beca~se ~he u!ilitarian value of their work fit the
patnotJc c~usc, ~hlch Imphes: that a~t with a patriotic purpose
deserved financ ial remuneration while art for its own sake d 'd
nOI. Though ~mith:s c1ai~ reprt'5e.nts no balanced observati~n
of art profeSSionalism,. it IS plausible that Smith's readers
have laken his claim at face value, especially when set aga~na:.
the backdrop of CPI publicity.
III. Freedom, Censorship and Art
The third consideration is the artists who worked fo th
CPI, their role as pub.lic serva~lS, and how this effected P~bli~
taste. Infla~~tory pictures gnpped the public with the horrors
of wu, ~eplctJng Germans as monstrous individuals. Vaughn
{I980~ cited that even Adlof Hitler wrote that the success of
Amenciiln propaga.nda could be iilttributed to its emotional
portuyal of t~e enemy as biilrbuic. The images of Gibson and h is
Bureau contnbuted a un iq ue visual impact, iillo ng with the film
~nd 'photognphy burt',lUs. Pictures of the war conve ed the
illUSIOn of a~ e~ewi~ness ateounl, which had a quick;;' effect
than iii descnptlOn In text. A$ mentioned, Lippmann (1922)
argued that propaganda filled the viewers head with images
that took the plac~ of the truth in hidden first hand facts. From
war .poslers, the Viewer learned not o nly information about th
wu In.wor~s, but ,the viewer's feelings were also affected b th:
~ns:'~lonahsm of III ustra tions. The artists of the CPI contrib~ ted
Significantly to no t only the information learned about the war
but also to the mood of the war,
'
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Another controversia1 aspect of war publicity was the degree
of Inflammatory content used. Just how noble some of these
images were raises doubt, states Vaughn (1980). OespiteGeorge
Creel's contention that the CPI iilVoided the use of atrocity
material, and that all the literature circulated came from the CPI,
the Liberty Loiiln Campaigns produced some of the goriest
images. Some of these works were questioTably inflamrn.J.tory,
which posed a problem for the CPI, thilt such sensa.tionalism
mighl be too rm.nipulative. One poster appearing in the Ladjes
Home Tournai was veryinflammatmy, captioned, "7his is Kultu'"
-a boy is held by two Gennan soldiers cutting off his hands,
while another German soldier in the background chokes iii
woman.
Whether such extremely sensational material came from
the CPI is unclear. Numerous artists fro m outsid e the CPI sent
illustrations, hoping to be recognized by the government for
their services. It is known that The Division of Pictorial Publicity
and the Division of Advertising worked closely together. The
Division of Advertising did nol have a sutriclent budget for
their own illustrators, and they frequenl.l y called on Gibson and
his colleagues for art work. Theadvertisers chose from drawings
submitted. To d iscern beyond d oubt how inflammatory the
official CPI illustrations became is dUficult. Many other private
organizations senl in works of questionable themes, iilnd some
were printed by other government offices, without consulting
the CPT. V.. ughn concludes, that until more evidence to the
contrary is presented, it can be assumed that all CPl posten
were done by CPl iilrtists.. Such posters as those appearing in
Liberty LoiiIR Campaigns may have been infbmmatory, but
Creel disclaimed any responsibility for or control over them
(Vaughn,1980).
CPI artists SiilW their charge as preserving d emocracy and
the nation. I.n deed, the CPT took propaganda beyond the
boundaries of printed text and the spoken word. Some of the
posters were intended to instruct the public for their health a nd
Siilfety, but others were blatant efforts to create fear and hatred
of the enemy (Vaughn, 1980, p, 158). In any case, to a publiC new
to an abundance of picture magazines and sensational advertising
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Illustrations, the wlr posters must have convinced many that
the nation needed their allegiance.
The power of the sensatio nal illustration served US
commerce after the war as well. The manipulation of emotions
became. sharpened 1001 of commerce, that the right feeling
cou.ld sell a product o r an idea. The ethereal qualities that the
public learned to assimilate from such advertising is what Neil
Harris termed "'public taste ... , the aesthetic kno wledgeability,
experiences, and preferences of the ent ir e population'"
(HalTis, 1991, p. 57). Commercial illustration and other related
forms of Idvertisint. such as department slore display and the
commerdal pro motions of the World's Fairs Imt followed in the
wake of World War I, became for the retail industry a lexicon fo r
what the middle-class public assumed was proper fashion.
The institutions hom which the public leJlfned about taste
competed for patronage. For ex.mple, by the 19205, museums in
Chicago competed fo r patronage with department stores, such
as Marshall Fields. Museums began to adapt 10 their collections
d.isplay techniques used in retail merchandising. and department
stores like Fields displayed hiSiorical exhibitions and sold art
works. The middle-class looked to stores to learn ho w to feel
about their appearance, and how to raise their sod.al status from
the stereotypes they saw in store windows (H.rris, 1990).
The effects of pictorial publldty were galvanized during
the war, and increased afterward into the mass advertising that
devt'loped through the 19205 and 19305. Though its educational
effects were more on the level of emotion rather than rational
judgment, it remains well-accepted in most accounts (Cremin,
1988; Vaughn, 1980; Harris, 1991; Lippmann, 1922) that the
Division of Pictorial Publicity conveyed successfully the content
of Americanism.

Conclusion
In reOection, The CPI was one of the first comprehensive
structures of pro paganda set up by the federal government. It
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effected every educational, cultural, .nd artistic strand of
American life. No single bureau or division could have worked
sepuately. Their effects combine into ... profuSion of national
-=ulture and mood that would mve been difficult to miss. As
education. the CPI aimed at the sensibility and home life of the
individual, as well as the professional training of Idults. As
publidty they aimed at the emotions-family bonds, national
10YIlties, fear of atrocity. The CPI's Igendes of the press, film,
and state fairs, among others, were also Influential to an extent
that is beyond the KOpe of this paper to analyse. The CPI
transmitted culturea-=ross the land in sucha variety of ways that
no single definition would satisfy. However, a recurring theme
throughout is the Committee's effects on the ability of men and
women to maintain an independent, rational mind in the midst
o f such a comprehensive blanket of publicity. Some believed
this impossible, while o thers held that the human mind could
rise above heavy-handed propaganda.
Comparing the views of Vaughn and Cremin illuminates
this double·bind : Vaughn (1980) concludes somewhat
sympathetically, making the CPI out to be a victim of its turbulent
times--of industrial expansion, of war, and of overwhelming
nu.m bers of new immigrants. The CPI officials also feared freewheeling. lajsKz·fajre individualism, believing that anar-=hy
arose from such extreme personal liberty. They emphasized
instead that democracy with politica.1liberty reqUired personal
responsibility, and obligation to the community. If democracy
was to work, an must adopt that attitude. Vaughn does not
acknowledge, however, the reformers who refused to pllY along
nationalist lines, Ind who were suspect of the free-wheeling
individua.1ism above. They were generally mistrusted.s radica.1s,
and were denied latitude for their views on the culture, art, or
the war. Vaughn argued that much of the Committee on Public
Information' s work was well-intentioned .nd worthwh.i1e, for
their stress on .... nti militlrism, anti-authoritarianism, and the
defense of democratic government. Its record was flawed by the
crusading zeal of the time" (p. 238).
Conversely, it cannot be ignored, stated Cremin (t988),
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that some 2,200 US men and women were prosecuted under the
Espionage and Sedition Acts, and that more than 1.000 of them
were convicted, "which could have only sent a chill thro ugh the
nation's agencies of education and communication" <p.345).
Cremin states further that perhaps the Committee did mobilize
public opinion so well that the maxims coined during that time
from publicity campaigns "making America safe for democracy,"
and "'the war to end all wars," only cont.ribuled 10 the
disillusionment that grew out of the economic and political
unrest following the Treaty of Versailles. Most Americans
would not have anticipated the Great Depression, the rise of
fascism in Europe and such undereurrents in the US.
Walter Lippmann and Edward Demays, who participated
in the CPI, found themselves disillusioned with democracy as a
fo nn of government, and with the ability of rational men and
women to make up their minds a bout anything. What both men
failed to see is tha t the average individual could learn the
difference between the freed om of education and the
miseducational constraint of propaganda, and that they could
learn to participate intelligently in public affairs (Cremin, 1988).
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suggested above, people can learn to make up their minds about
what they read, see, and hea r . Though some may mistrust some
or all of what they hear and see, it remains that each individual
may choose for themselves belief or mistrust, beauty or ugliness.
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